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French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War:
Looking Inward or Outward?
Olivier Schmitt
Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark (SDU), Denmark
ABSTRACT
For some, a speciﬁc feature of the French armed forces' adaptation process in
the adaptation process would be the capacity to look inward instead of
outward in order to identify relevant solutions to tactical/doctrinal problems.
This article questions such a narrative, and argues that the French armed
forces are as quick as any to borrow from other countries’ experiences. In
order to do so, this article introduces the concept of ‘selective emulation’, and
compares the French and German military adaptation processes in
Afghanistan. The article argues that there is indeed something distinctive
about French military adaptation, but it is not what the ﬁercest defenders of
the French ‘exceptionalism’ usually account for.
KEYWORDS France; Germany; Military Adaptation; Afghanistan; Selective Emulation
Introduction
Observers have long noted the French tendency selectively to use France’s
own history to justify current policies. For example, Beatrice Heuser
observes: ‘History is drawn upon to justify France’s claim to leadership
today, to legitimize her political system, to give her direction in her foreign
and defence policies. The past is France’s guide for the future’1
Similarly, a traditional narrative about the French way of warfare is the
alleged capacity of the French armed forces to borrow from a rich military
tradition of colonial warfare2 in order to get a better sense of local dynamics
and appropriate tactics in the case of interventions ‘among the people’.3 For
example, military historian Jean-Charles Jauﬀret mentions the existence of a
‘French touch’, based on the accumulated and distilled knowledge of French
CONTACT Olivier Schmitt schmitt@sam.sdu.dk
1Beatrice Heuser, ‘Historical Lessons and Discourse on Defence in France and Germany, 1945-1990’,
Rethinking History 2/2 (1998), 214. See also Ulrich Krotz, History and Foreign Policy in France and
Germany (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2015).
2On the ambiguities of the French colonial experience for modern counter-insurgency, see Etienne de
Durand, ‘Francs-Tireurs et Centurions. Les ambiguïtés de l’héritage contre-insurrectionel français’,
Focus Stratégique 29 (March 2011).
3Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane 2005).
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colonial warfare, which he compares to an allegedly less historically-
informed American approach in Afghanistan.4 It is likely that diﬀerent
military traditions and experiences have shaped diﬀerent military practices
over time, for example in preferred tactics or procedures for operational
planning:5 scholars have long documented the existence of diﬀerent ‘ways
of war’ or ‘strategic cultures’, and how they are shaped by the speciﬁc
historical experiences of a given political community. However, this obser-
vation of the existence of diﬀerent military practices can also become a
rhetorical tool for practitioners, boasting alleged expertise derived from
unique and extensive experience.6 In the French case, this tendency is
translated into an argument about the added-value for the French forces
of looking back, towards their own historical experience in order to derive
meaningful lessons, instead of looking elsewhere and observing what their
partners are doing. In short, the French forces are supposedly better oﬀ
being introspective than conducting a benchmark analysis. For example,
General Guy Hubin writes:
We [the French] still have a role to play, and it is not by limiting ourselves to an
unproductive mimetism that we will play it. The theories and practices of our allies,
interesting as theymay be, are not always in line with our interests or methods, but
mostly are out of touch with reality. Following such methods like sheeps, just
because of our membership to the Atlantic Alliance, is without interest.7
Similar discourses can often be heard within the armed forces,8 and a split
seems to be emerging between those who value the inspiration from allies,
and those who are much more reluctant and fear a loss of doctrinal and
tactical originality.9 Yet, this fear confuses the descriptive and the normative:
although initially warning against the careless observation of the allies’ prac-
tices and advocating for the search of endogenous solutions within French
military history, critics regularly slide towards a romanticised description of
the French armed forces as having always been looking inward instead of
outward in their search for solutions to tactical/operational problems. In this
argument, French exceptionalism is presented as being the ability to ﬁnd
autonomous solutions. This line of thinking is often heard within the French
armed forces, with an associated lamentation about the need to improve and
augment the number of classes in military history through an oﬃcer’s career.
4Jean-Charles Jauﬀret, La Guerre Inachevée, Afghanistan 2011-2013 (Paris: Autrement 2013).
5The French General Michel Yakovleﬀ often uses the American tactics and procedures as a ‘shadow
case’ highlighting the diﬀerences between the French approach in his book Tactique Théorique, 2nd
ed. (Paris: Economica 2009).
6In the British case, see Andrew Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth: the British Experience of
Irregular Warfare (Abingdon: Routledge 2011).
7Guy Hubin, La Guerre. Une Vision Française (Paris: Economica 2012), 255.
8The author heard similar arguments in multiple interviews.
9Anne-Henry de Russé, ‘France’s Return into NATO. French Military Culture and Strategic Identity in
Question’, Focus Stratégique no. 22 bis, October 2010.
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The website of the French Army centre for strategic studies (CESAT)
perfectly embodies this tendency. One can read articles written by mid-
career oﬃcers explaining that military history must be developed because it
improves oﬃcers’ understanding of the French military traditions, thus
making them better soldiers;10 tactical proﬁciency is based on the respect
of national characteristics, and studying national military history is necessary
for future performance;11 or the French national character has been con-
stant for more than a millennium, and studying it is necessary to prepare
future successes and avoid blunders.12 This argument is intriguing, as mili-
tary practices are always inﬂuenced, shaped and transformed through the
interactions with other military organisations and cultures, even in the
French case.13 Yet, its prevalence within the French armed forces makes it
worth investigating, thus giving a closer look at the mechanisms by which
the interactions with allies in a multinational context inﬂuence national
military practices (themselves already shaped by culture and experience).
By doing so, it becomes possible to establish what is exceptional, or not, in
the French way of warfare, in particular in the case of a multinational
operations such as the intervention in Afghanistan, and whether the
French armed forces actually look more inwards than outward. It is then
worthwhile to look at the French military adaptation during the Afghanistan
conﬂict, as a recent example of a long intervention in a multinational
context, triggering change in the armed forces.
Military adaptation is important, because the way military organisations
tackle operational challenges inﬂuences battleﬁeld outcomes. In that regard,
much work has been conducted in studying the bottom-up adaptation
process of units on the ground. While this vertical process of adaptation
must be explored in its own terms, it can also be complemented with the
study of the horizontal dimension of adaptation, which is emulation. Military
organisations copy each other, and borrow from partners already-proven
combat solutions, especially in the context of an alliance such as NATO.
This article explores this horizontal mechanism through the comparative
study of the French and German military adaptation in Afghanistan. It shows
that, in both cases, external solutions were sought from the US and the UK,
10Vincent Bureau, ‘Enseignement de l’histoire militaire: une renaissance essentielle’, Pensées mili-terre,
available at http://www.penseemiliterre.fr/enseignement-de-l-histoire-militaire-une-renaissance-
essentielle_2016275.html (last accessed 22 April 2016).
11Destia, ‘Facteur culturel et tactique à l’épreuve de l’histoire’, Pensées mili-terre, available at http://
www.penseemiliterre.fr/facteur-culturel-et-tactique-a-l-epreuve-de-l-histoire_2022521.html (last
accessed 22 April 2016)
12Didier Ozanne, ‘Bon sang ne saurait mentir, ou quelques traits persistants du caractère français à
travers les âges’, Pensées mili-terre, available at http://www.penseemiliterre.fr/-bon-sang-ne-saurait-
mentir-ou-quelques-traits-persistants-du-caractere-francais-a-travers-les-ages-militaires-_2014156.
html (last accessed 22 April 2016).
13Walter Bruyère-Ostells and François Dumasy (eds), Pratiques Militaires et Globalisation, XIXe-XXIe
Siècles (Paris: Bernard Giovanangeli éditeur 2014).
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but that their implementation suﬀered diﬀerentiated fates depending on
idiosyncratic factors such as historical experiences or material constraints.
This process of importing parts of others’ solutions is labelled here as
‘selective emulation’, and the comparative case study permits the identiﬁca-
tion of the variation in the intervening variables. This ﬁnding is important in
studying the alleged ‘French exceptionalism’ in military aﬀairs, as it shows
that despite a rhetoric of ﬁnding indigenous solutions to operational pro-
blems, the French armed forces are quick to borrow from other armed
forces, especially the UK and the US. There is indeed something distinctive
about French military adaptation, but it is not what the ﬁercest defenders of
the French ‘exceptionalism’ usually account for.
In the remainder of this article, I ﬁrst lay out the conceptual framework
for the article, explaining the process of ‘selective emulation’. I then turn to
an analysis of the French and German campaigns in Afghanistan, which
serves as the background for this study. Explaining the French and German
performances in detail is important, because the operational approach of
the two countries considerably evolved over time and is probably less
known, considering that the English-speaking literature has been dominated
by accounts of the American and British experiences. The ﬁnal two sections
look at the changes in doctrines and materials and highlight the process of
selective emulation.
Military Change in a Multinational Context
The military campaign in Afghanistan has generated an important literature
studying how and when military organisations change in order to tackle the
challenges they were confronting on the ground, a process called ‘adapta-
tion’. A major milestone in this research was the publication in 2013 of
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, edited by Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and
James A. Russell. In the introduction to the edited volume, Farrell describes a
number of drivers and shapers of military adaptation, including within the
latter category domestic politics, alliance politics, strategic culture and civil-
military relations (Table 1).
However, the understanding of the shaping inﬂuence of alliance politics is
limited to strategic adaptation and leaves aside the study of operational
adaptation. Instead, I argue that alliance politics also shapes military adaptation
Table 1. Drivers and shapers of Military adaptation (Farrell et al., 2013, 8).
Drivers Shapers Adaptations
Operational Challenges Domestic Politics Strategic
Alliance Politics Strategy, force levels and resources
New Technologies Strategic Culture Operational
Civil-Military Relations Doctrine, training, plans and operations
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through a mechanism of mimetic isomorphism, which predicts that ‘when
organizations are faced with uncertainty, they may model themselves after
other organizations, which provide to the borrowing organization practices
that furnish a solution to the problem confronted’.14 I suggest the following
mechanism: taken aback by the evolution of the ﬁghting in Afghanistan, France
and Germany sought answers to the operational challenges they were facing
within NATO (within the institutional structure of other member-states). This
mimetic isomorphism occurs at diﬀerent tempos, from 2008 for the French and
from 2010 for the Germans. In both cases, a ‘transformative moment’ triggers
such changes. Moreover, the mimetic isomorphism does not lead to a standar-
disation of the armed forces of both countries. Several intermediary variables
must be taken into account, such as national strategic cultures, the internal
political context or the existence of a strong national defence industry. In the
end, we observe a mechanism of selective mimetic isomorphism (or selective
emulation): the importation of external doctrinal and material solutions is
ﬁltered through a number of idiosyncratic national experiences.15
The comparison between France and Germany is interesting, because the
two countries were facing similar conditions in Afghanistan (including simi-
lar combat conditions in 2010–2012), and deployed a comparable number
of troops (4000 for France, 5000 for Germany). The similarity of the combat
experiences permits explanation of variations in military adaptation by
national-level variables and not by exogenous variables, thus showing
how the mechanism of selective emulation operates in national contexts.
The indicators chosen for the comparison are the changes in doctrine and
the changes in materials deployed on the ground. Doctrine is both a codiﬁca-
tion of tacit knowledge about the best way to wage war, and a guide for the
practitioner. It is a tool of education, a tool of command, and a tool of change
within the armed forces.16 Changes in materials are also an important indicator,
because they show what an army will deploy in combat. Combined, changes in
doctrine and materials are a good indication of operational adaptation.
French and German Performances in Afghanistan
France
During the 2001–07 period, the French conventional contribution was lim-
ited to patrolling in Kabul and training the Afghan National Forces, while
also providing occasional air support to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). France was only the
14Terry Terriﬀ, ‘U.S. Ideas and Military Change in NATO, 1989-1994’, in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriﬀ
(eds.), The Sources of Military Change (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2002), 95.
15See also Olivier Schmitt, ‘Européanisation ou Otanisation ? Le Royaume-Uni, la France et l’Allemagne
en Afghanistan’, Politique Européenne 48 (2015), 150-77.
16Harald Høiback, ‘What is Doctrine ?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 34/6 (2011) 879-900.
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seventh contributor to the ISAF because Afghanistan was not seen as a high
strategic priority. The main French asset was the group of Special Forces
engaged in Operation Ares conducting high-value missions, but their limited
number and the secrecy surrounding SF operations limited the overall value
of the French contribution.
The French campaign plans fundamentally evolved with the election of
Nicolas Sarkozy, who decided to increase the French contribution. France
agreed to take responsibility of the Kapisa and Surobi regions north of
Kabul, two small mountainous areas of critical strategic importance because
of their proximity to both Kabul and the Salang highway. The provinces
geographically command access to the Northern part of Afghanistan from
Kabul, but also to Pakistan through Laghman province. Because of its
strategic importance, the area had already been viciously fought over by
the Mujahedeen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.17 France
deployed a brigade in the region, and thus came under the command of the
Regional Command East (RCE). However, because France had earlier refused
to participate in the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) system, the divi-
sion of labour between Europeans and Americans was turned on its head in
Kapisa. Whereas most European countries ran their own PRT with American
troops providing the main battleﬁeld force, the opposite happened: an
American PRT conducted civilian actions with French military forces con-
ducting combat operations.18
The ﬁrst French Task Force (codename ‘Chimère’) to operate in Kapisa
was formed around the Paratroopers of the 8th Régiment Parachutiste
d’Infanterie de Marine, led by Colonel Jacques Aragones, and started arriving
in Kapisa in June 2008. The progressive build-up was terminated in July
2008. In total, the Task Force Chimère was a battalion-size unit (around 750
personnel), organised around three riﬂe companies. Colonel Aragones’ cam-
paign plans were organised around three main axes:
● Conducting daily patrols, in order to show the population that the
coalition was in control
● Conducting large-scale operations, with US air support, in order to
push back the insurgents from the valleys
● Conducting Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities in support of
the population.19
17Guillaume Lasconjarias, ‘Kapisa, Kalachnikov et Korrigan’, Cahiers de l’Irsem no. 9 (Paris: Irsem, 2011).
18Joshua Foust, ‘France in Kapisa. A Combined Approach to Statebuilding’, in Nik Hynek and Péter
Marton (eds.), Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction (Abingdon:
Routledge 2012), 88–103.
19‘Afghanistan, Six mois en Kapisa. Témoignage du Colonel Arragones’, Ministère de la Défense.
Available at: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afghanistan/actualites/12-03-09-afghanistan-6-
mois-en-kapisa-interview-du-colonel-aragones (last accessed 26 November 2013).
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In fact, the approach of securing lines of communications and patrolling was
familiar to the French troops who had been conducting peacekeeping
operations in Kosovo and Africa. In retrospect, the diﬃculties of the
Afghan terrain seem to have been underestimated. As a French oﬃcer
explained:
we had missed the Iraq War, where the Americans and the British had learnt
the hard way how modern conﬂicts could be extremely violent. There was also
this myth of the ‘French touch’, of the French soldier who knows how to blend
in the population. In a way, we still fantasized about a romanticized Lyautey.
So we went in doing what we had learned to do during the 1990s in the
Balkans: peacekeeping. We paid the bloodprice for not realizing early enough
that Afghanistan would be nothing like what we had encountered so far.20
The transformative moment was the ambush in the Uzbeen valley on 19
August 2008, during which 10 soldiers were killed and 21 wounded. This
loss, the most important for French forces since the attack on the Drakkar
building in Lebanon in 1983, was a shock for both the French population
and the armed forces, triggering a number of political and military
responses. First, the Ministry of Defence drastically improved the quality of
the equipment. But mostly, the armed forces acknowledged that the degree
of violence encountered in Afghanistan was much higher than in the pre-
vious deployments they had been accustomed to. When Task Force Tiger
took over from Chimère in November 2008, the mountain troops com-
manded by Colonel Nicolas Le Nen battled the Taliban and kept them at
bay.21 The elite troops were perfectly suited to the mountainous environ-
ment of Kapisa, and Le Nen conducted a large number of kinetic operations,
speciﬁcally in order to secure the surroundings of the Alasay valley. The
main operation, conducted in two days in March 2009 (operation ‘Dinner
Out’) eliminated about half of the Taliban ﬁghters controlling the Alasay
valley (80 to 120 killed or wounded out of 200), which allowed the French to
establish combat outposts in the populated areas, thus allowing the PRT to
conduct development activities. However, the Task Force Tiger failed to
secure the entire district, and several intelligence sources reported that
the kinetic operations conducted by the mountain troops were antagonising
the local population.22
Following the mountain troops, Task Force Korrigan took over in May
2009. Led by Colonel Françis Chanson, the task force adopted a wholly
diﬀerent approach to the operations, taking into account the limitations of
purely kinetic actions. Chanson organised his action around three main lines
of operations: ‘ﬁrst, attrition rather than destruction, second, deterrent
20Interview with a French oﬃcer, Paris, 11 June 2011.
21Nicolas Le Nen, Task Force Tiger. Journal de Marche d’un Chef de Corps Français en Afghanistan (Paris:
Economica 2010).
22Foust, ‘France in Kapisa’, 2012.
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pressure in the margins rather than quadrillage of the area of operations,
third, a spatial discrimination leading to a careful control of a few selected
areas through persistent presence in the villages’.23 Conceptually, control-
ling and securing the population were seen as the key factors of success.
The following Task Forces in both Kapisa and Surobi then subsequently
adopted this conceptual change.
In the fall of 2009, the French forces underwent a deep restructuring with
the creation of the Task Force La Fayette. A brigade-size unit, TF La Fayette
reunited under a single command the French forces in Surobi and Kapisa.
The units deployed in these two areas were renamed (from ‘Task Force’ to
‘Battlegroup’), and their structure changed. Each battalion-sized unit was
expanded and included four companies instead of three. Moreover, artillery
capability was deployed as well as light tanks, in order to raise the ﬁrepower
of the French troops. In total, the TF La Fayette amounted to about 2800
troops. The mix of kinetic and population-centric actions that had charac-
terised the action of the Task Force ‘Korrigan’ were carried on by other
Battlegroups. For example, the legionnaires of the Battlegroup Altor,
deployed in the Surobi district between December 2009 and May 2010
conducted major operations in order to keep the insurgents at bay (opera-
tions ‘Septentrion’ and ‘Dragon’) and aimed at securing the Tagab valley,
while in the meantime politically engaging the population through the
dissemination of combat outposts, the use of political oﬃcers and the
mentoring of the Afghan National Army (ANA).
It seemed that the French eﬀorts achieved noticeable success, despite the
initial diﬃculties in cooperating with the American PRT.24 Yet, two main
factors limited the eﬀectiveness of the French campaign. First, at the end of
2010, an ‘operational pause’ was imposed on the French troops by their
political authorities following the capture of two French journalists by the
Taliban in December 2009. It appears that the French intelligence services
made contact with the captors at the end of 2010 and requested an
operational pause in order to facilitate liberation of the hostages, which
was ﬁnalised in June 2011. In the meantime, French forces were instructed
to avoid large-scale operations and nearly stopped the patrols and the
engagement with the local population. An angry French oﬃcer recalled:
‘we were staying in our FOBs [Forward Operating Base], under the rockets
the insurgents would ﬁre at us on a daily basis, without being able to go out
because of these two idiots [the two journalists]. What was the point of
conducting so many operations since 2008, losing soldiers, if all this eﬀort
was ruined in six months?’25
23Stéphane Taillat, ‘National Traditions and International Context: French Adaptation to
Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century’, Security Challenges 6/1 (2010), 93.
24Foust, ‘France in Kapisa’, 2012.
25Interview with a French oﬃcer, Paris, 28 March 2013.
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Second, divergence of strategic priorities emerged between the TF La
Fayette and the RC-E. While the French troops wanted to secure the gains
obtained in the Tagab and Alasay Valleys, the American command of the RC-
E wanted them to focus on securing the Main Supply Road (MSR) Vermont,
an important logistical axis. French troops simply did not have enough
resources to conduct both actions simultaneously. They eventually suc-
ceeded in securing MSR Vermont as requested, but this was at the expense
of the security in the Kapisa and Surobi districts, where Taliban ﬁghters
could re-inﬁltrate.26 Yet, the situation had improved, as Kapisa and Surobi
were transferred to the Afghan forces in 2012, before the withdrawal of the
French combat troops was completed. Nevertheless, these two districts are
still violent, even by Afghan standards, and the French ultimately failed to
secure Kapisa and Surobi.
Germany
There have been three distinct phases in the engagement of the
Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. The ﬁrst phase was between the initial deploy-
ment to Kunduz and the summer of 2007. During this time, the Bundeswehr
carried out reconstruction and stabilisation missions. The second phase,
between late 2007 to late 2008 was a transition period during which mission
requirements expanded due to the changing tactical situation, while the
broader mandate of the contingent remained unchanged. The third phase,
from 2009 until 2014, corresponds to the progressive alignment of the
mandate and the counter-insurgency operations the Bundeswehr was
involved in.27
Between 2003 and 2007, the Bundeswehr faced a largely stable environ-
ment. The Northern parts of Afghanistan in which the Bundeswehr was
deployed had been known for their opposition to the Taliban, and the
predominantly Uzbek and Tajik population had no interest in its return. In
fact, the main threat for the German forces came from the clashes between
warlords and their armed groups, two of which (commanded respectively by
Rashid Dostum and Mohammed Atta) were engaged in clashes in 2003.28
The second potentially problematic issue was the fact that the North had
traditionally been an area of poppy cultivation. Yet, despite these two
26Stéphane Taillat and Florent de Saint Victor, ‘Has France Lost Afghanistan?’, Alliance Géostratégique,
21 June 2012.
27Christoph Zürcher, ‘Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan (ISAF)’, in Hans J. Gießmann and Armin Wagner
(eds), Armee im Einsatz. Grundlagen, Strategien und Ergebnisse einer Beteiligung der Bundeswehr
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag 2009), 328–39; Winfried Nachtwei, ‘Der Afghanistaneinsatz der
Bundeswehr – Von der Friedenssicherung zur Aufständsbekämpfung’’ in Anja Seiﬀert, Phil C.
Langer and Carsten Pietsch (eds), Der Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Sozial- und Politik-
wissenschäftliche Perspektiven (Berlin: Springer Verlag 2012), 33–48.
28Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter, ‘The Northern Front, the Afghan Insurgency Spreading
Beyond the Pashtuns’, Afghan Analyst Network, Brieﬁng Paper No. 3, 2010.
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potentially dangerous issues, the security situation remained stable. The
most dangerous situations the German soldiers faced were the management
of drug-related criminal activities. This is fortunate, because the Kunduz PRT
was seriously under-resourced in terms of military presence, with only 90
infantry soldiers- not enough to patrol the entire province. The PRT also
lacked critical capabilities, such as armoured vehicles, aerial reconnaissance,
air mobility and heavy weapons.29
The mandate itself was fairly limited. The Bundeswehr was tasked with
establishing a secure environment for Afghan government oﬃcials and the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA); engaging in the
demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of the local militias;
and supporting the reform of the ANSF. There was a political reason for this
restraint: the government did not want the German mission to be associated
with the use of military force: ‘the intention was to keep the visible military
presence “as limited as possible” and emphasize Germany’s political, eco-
nomic and social engagement, as speciﬁed in the government’s
Afghanistan-Konzept of 2003’.30 This preference for a limited military
engagement was translated in the rules of engagement (RoEs) and the
caveats imposed on the German military action. Most notably, German
forces were tied to the northern part of Afghanistan, and thus could not
be redeployed to support the allies’ military actions in other parts of the
country. German troops could use force only in self-defence and after
repeated warnings to the enemy; they were not allowed to pursue retreat-
ing adversaries; and, as of 2006, they could only patrol in armoured
vehicles.31 This posture attracted harsh criticism, especially from the allies
deployed in Southern parts of Afghanistan such as the United Kingdom and
Canada, but the German government successfully resisted the pressures to
increase its contribution and, considering the relatively stable situation in
the German sector, could easily portray a ﬂattering picture of the diﬀerences
of approach between the German troops focused on reconstruction and
stability and the ‘trigger-happy’ British and American forces.
This quiet phase was disrupted in May 2007, however, when a suicide attack
on the Kunduz market killed three German soldiers. There was a brutal realisa-
tion in German political-military circles that the security situation had suddenly
deteriorated, and the nature of themissionwas about to change.32 During 2006
29Sascha Lange, ‘Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Personal und technische Austattung in der
Einsatzrealität’, SWP-Studie 9, March 2008.
30Timo Behr, ‘Germany and Regional Command-North: ISAF’s Weakest Link?’, in Hynek and Marton
(eds), Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 50.
31Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, ‘Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of
National Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan’, International Studies Quarterly 56/1 (2012),
67–84.
32The author was working in the French military mission in Berlin at the time, and recalls a large
number of meetings with German colleagues during which it was clearly expressed that the Kunduz
market attack was a turning point for the German involvement.
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and the beginning of 2007, the Talibanmanaged to re-inﬁltrate the North using
Pashtun refugees as a cover. They gradually gained control of the small Pashtun
areas in the northern provinces, and used them as bases of operation. The new
operational reality suddenly became the increased attacks on the coalition
troops, to which the Germans were slow to adapt. The initial reaction was to
reduce the Bundeswehr patrols and concentrate on force protection. The result
was to further increase the physical distance between the German forces and
the population.33 Facing an increase of insurgent activities, German comman-
ders devised a number of ‘clear-hold-build’ operations in order to regain
momentum. In the fall of 2007, the Bundeswehr conducted Operations
Harekate Yolo I and II in order to drive the Taliban out of Badakhshan and
Faryab provinces.34 Yet, the operational role of the German forces was extre-
mely limited, as they only provided support to the combat troops furnished by
the Norwegian forces and the ANA. In 2007–08, the Bundeswehr remained
limited to a support role. Yet, there was a growing gap between the actual
mandate and the mission requirements, which called for an increasingly
aggressive force posture. The rules of engagement were increasingly out of
tune with the events on the ground. For example, during Operation Harekate
Yolo II, the German helicopters were still not authorised to conduct MedEvac
nighttime operations, which forced the operations to stop at dusk, allowing the
Taliban forces to disperse.35 Thus, the 2007–08 period is marked by a gap
between the political constraints imposed by Berlin (where political leaders
wanted to maintain the image of a Bundeswehr mission primarily focused on
reconstruction and development) and the reality of the changing military
situation on the ground.
The German approach to the Afghanistan mission changed in 2009, with
policy-makers realising that the aforementioned gap between the mission
and the mandate had to be bridged. The mandates started to evolve at the
end of 2008, when the Bundeswehr no longer had to protect the UNAMA
and the Afghan government, but had to support them in establishing a
secure environment. In 2010, the mandate was further extended to include
the protection of the civilian population. This evolution had direct conse-
quences for the German campaign plans on the ground: ‘these two adjust-
ments provided German forces with considerably greater leeway to use
force in a proactive manner in fulﬁlment of their mission requirements’.36
The rules of engagement were also considerably relaxed, and allowed
German soldiers to use force pre-emptively and pursue the enemy, eased
the restrictions on the use of heavy weapons and gave more freedom to
local commanders. This change had immediate consequences. By May 2009,
33Zürcher, ‘Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan’, 328–39.
34Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid, ‘Germany’s Options in Afghanistan’, Survival 51/5 (2009), 71–90.
35Jerome Starkey, ‘For us ze War is over by Tea Time, Ja’, Sunday Times, 18 November 2008.
36Behr, ‘Germany and Regional Command’, 53.
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German forces were involved in the active pursuit of insurgents for the ﬁrst
time. In July 2009, the ﬁrst German ground oﬀensive since the Second World
War (Operation Oqab) took place and involved 300 German and 800 Afghan
soldiers.37 Operation Oqab was the ﬁrst German attempt to reclaim the
strategic initiative from the insurgents.
In 2009 and 2010, Germany conducted a number of oﬀensive operations
aimed at establishing FOBs that could be handed over to the ANA. These
various operations (Operation Sahda Ehlm, Operations Taohid I and II,
Operation Gala-e-Gorg and Operation Halmazag) resembled the major COIN-
type operations that were conducted in the South by other countries, involving
close air support, artillery and light armoured tanks.38 This evolution towards a
more assertive posture was facilitated by the arrival of American troops in
Northern Afghanistan in 2009, which also focused on ﬁghting the Taliban.
It is in this context that the infamous “Kunduz incident” occurred. In
September 2009, a German commander, Colonel Klein, called in an airstrike
based on one single HUMINT (human intelligence) source, which led to the
deaths of 142, of which at least 100 were Afghan civilians, including
children.39 While German politicians initially tried to justify Colonel Klein’s
actions, a number of revelations in the press and allegations of a cover-up
led to the resignations of Franz-Joseph Jung (defence minister at the time of
the incident), Peter Wichert (deputy defence minister) and Wolfgang
Schneiderhan (chief of the joint staﬀ).
The Kunduz airstrike did not stop the process of military adaptation to the
situation on the ground. In fact, the government reacted in granting local
commanders a greater say in determining the shape of the German mission.
The “Kunduz incident” revealed a number of ﬂaws in the German conduct of
operations, in particular the violation of ISAF rules of engagement. However,
the German performance cannot be reduced to this event. It appears that the
German conduct of operations at the tactical level strongly improved over time
to match the level of skills showcased by more experienced nations. For
example, the ﬁrst staﬀ oﬃcer to receive the newly created (or more accurately
re-created) German Cross of Bravery, Lieutenant-Colonel Sembritzki, was
awarded this honour after he successfully managed to defend a German out-
post outnumbered by insurgents, regrouping his soldiers, organising the
defence and counter-attacking.40 This type of actions is proof of a real tactical
37Timo Behr, ‘Germany’, in Toby Archer (ed.), Afghanistan’s Hard Summer: the Impact on European Troop
Contributing Nations, UPI Brieﬁng Paper 43, September 2009.
38Hans-Christoph Grohman, Thorsten Kasper and Jan Hecht, ‘Der Einsatz der QRF3 in Afghanistan vom
14.04 bis 18.10.2009’, Der Panzergrenadier 26/09 (2009) 35–38.
39Constantin Schüßler and Yee-Kuan Heng, ‘The Bundeswehr and the Kunduz Air Strike 4 September
2009: Germany’s Post-Heroic Moment?’, European Security 22/3 (2013), 355–75.
40Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe, ‘Mission Command Without a Mission: German Military Adaptation in
Afghanistan’, in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A. Russell (eds), Military Adaptation in
Afghanistan (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2013), 207.
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improvement for the Bundeswehr after the political-strategic level had been
willing to loosen the rules of engagement. In 2010, Germany initiated a strategy
of progressive transfer of responsibility to the Afghan forces. German forces
were reorganisedwith the addition of two 700-strong battalions operatingwith
the Afghan forces. By 2013, the Germans had begun to hand over the FOBs to
the Afghan National Security Forces, and the northern districts were considered
less violent than other regions of Afghanistan. However, a debate emerged in
Germany about the overall conduct of the campaign after a report released by
the Afghan Analyst Network in November 2013 revealed that by partnering
with the local power brokers, the Germans had actually reinforced the local
distribution of power in favour of known warlords.41 While the debate was
heated in the German press, the problem is similar throughout Afghanistan.
The Evolution of Counter-Insurgency Doctrines
Following the diﬃcult experience in Iraq, the US Army and the US Marines
produced a new counter-insurgency doctrine that was trying to encapsulate
and institutionalise the lessons learned from the diﬃcult ﬁghts of 2004 and
2005. The now-famous FM 3-24 that emerged as a result focused on the
links between the protection of local populations and the legitimacy of
counterinsurgents, thus acknowledging the fundamental political character
of an insurgency. The doctrine comprised ﬁve elements:
● First and foremost, it acknowledged that an insurgency is a speciﬁc
type of conﬂict, whose characteristics and dynamics diﬀer from those
of conventional operations.
● Hence, the source of success in any counter-insurgency campaign does
not primarily depend on the eﬀectiveness of military operations as
such, but lies in the capacity of military operations to contribute to
the establishment of a legitimate political context favouring the ruling
government (delegitimising the insurgents).
● The missions undertaken by the armed forces are consequently varied
and numerous. In addition to ﬁghting the insurgents, armed forces can
also engage in reconstruction work and local development, in partner-
ship with civilian organisations (governmental or non-governmental).
● The use of force must be limited, in order to avoid alienating local
populations.
● The length of a counter-insurgency campaign is always long.
41Philipp Münch, ‘Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention’, AAN
Report, 12 November 2013; Böge, Friederike, ‘Die Bundeswehr als Komplize der herrschenden
Klasse?’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2013.
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The adoption of FM 3-24, which introduced important conceptual innova-
tions while codifying a number of incremental adaptations and new prac-
tices already adopted and enforced by US troops on the ground,42 is
considered a turning point for the US campaign in Iraq.
NATO was quickly interested in this doctrinal innovation, in particular
following the degradation of the military situation in Afghanistan between
2006 and 2008. Two American oﬃcers based at the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) initiated the ﬁrst studies aimed at establish-
ing a NATO doctrine for counter-insurgency in 2008. The doctrinal docu-
ment, known as AJP 3.4.4 (Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency) was
circulated in 2009 among member-states, and showcased the American
inﬂuence by identifying the same ﬁve key points as the FM 3-24.43 In the
meantime, member-states also began to revise their own COIN doctrines.
When the French armed forces increased their commitment to the
Afghan campaign by deploying troops to the Kapisa and Surobi regions in
2008, their doctrine was still marked by peacekeeping experiences in the
Balkans in the 1990s, and emphasised the ‘control of violence’. However, the
change in military practices that followed the Uzbeen ambush was accom-
panied by a renewal in doctrinal thinking. The Army doctrinal research
centre (CDEF by the French acronym) published a new doctrinal document
in 2009, avoiding the term ‘counter-insurgency’ and preferring the name
‘counter-rebellion’. In the document, ‘rebellion’ is understood as a generic
name for a wide range of tactical modes of actions, such as guerrillas and
terrorism. To justify the use of the term ‘rebellion’, the authors explained
that the word ‘insurgency’ was equivalent to the ‘levée en masse’ which, in
the French political mythology, was a reference to the battles of revolu-
tionary France against monarchist Europe. It would then have been impro-
per to use a positively connoted word to describe enemy activities.44 The
document itself cautiously borrows from the Algerian war a number of
tactical principles and tactical actions, without mentioning the larger poli-
tical context of the conﬂict. The document therefore cannot be considered
the equivalent of FM 3-24, since the latter does not shy away from making
operational and strategic recommendations while the French document,
aware of the touchiness of dealing with the Algerian war, only uses it as a
source of tactical lessons.
A ﬁrst change occurred with the publication, by three French oﬃcers with
command experiences in Kapisa, of a book using the term ‘counter-insurgency’
42Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press
2011); Russel, James A., Innovation, Transformation and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar
and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007 (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2011).
43Olof Kronvall and Petersson Magnus (2011), ‘US and NATO COIN Doctrine. Logic, Content and
Implications’, paper presented at International Studies Association annual meeting, Montréal.
44Interviews in Paris, June 2012.
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in early 2010.45 The book itself is a good summary of the international debates
on COIN that followed the publication of the FM 3-24, which is a clear source of
inspiration. Although it is not an oﬃcial publication, the book was widely
circulated and commented on in military circles and in the professional litera-
ture. These three oﬃcers, having been exposed to international literature on
the topic during their time in Afghanistan, served as bridge-builders and
facilitated the importation of the main themes and concepts from FM 3-24.
Counter-insurgency was ﬁnally integrated in the French doctrine at the
end of 2010, with the publication by the Joint Doctrinal Centre (CICDE) of a
‘Joint Doctrine on Counter-Insurgency’. While the army doctrinal centre was
reluctant to use the term ‘insurgency’, the Joint Doctrinal Centre had no
such hesitations, and clearly stated that the French doctrine is ‘the national
complement to the NATO doctrine of counter-insurgency AJP 3.4.4’.
Exemplifying this inscription within the international vulgate on COIN, the
deﬁnition of counter-insurgency is directly borrowed from the NATO doc-
trine. Some diﬀerences remain nonetheless, and the French doctrine is not a
copy-paste from the NATO doctrine. For example, the French document is
more cautious than the NATO one on the issue of ‘winning the hearts and
minds’, and the nature of the operations designed to secure the population.
For the French armed forces, counter-insurgency is one of the various ways
to conduct a stabilisation campaign, and is not a speciﬁc way of warfare. The
aim is then to disaggregate the insurgency and deprive it of popular sup-
port as part of a wider manoeuvre involving both civilian and military
elements. The concept is more akin to the American ‘Clear-Hold-Build’
than to the British ‘Shape-Secure-Develop’.
The French doctrinal adaptation is then the result of a selective importation
of the NATO doctrine of counter-insurgency, which is done in steps and
through a gradual exposure to international experiences. The Algerian war
serves as a second intellectual source mitigating the full importation of the
NATO doctrine. As such, the inﬂuence of the NATO doctrine is exerted on the
conceptualisation of counter-insurgency and operational level activities, while
the Algerian war serves as a resource for tactical lessons but without any further
thinking on the operational-strategic consequences of such actions, due to the
sensitivity of the topic within the French military and French society at large.
In Germany, the doctrinal evolution is set against the backdrop of the
reticence of the population and most civilian elites towards the use of
armed force.46 In that regard, German policy-makers were in the diﬃcult
45Hervé De Courrège, Emmanuel Germain and Nicolas Le Nen, Principes de Contre-Insurrection (Paris:
Economica 2010).
46John S. Duﬃeld, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security
Policy after Uniﬁcation (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press 1998); Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the
Use of Force (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2004); Olivier Schmitt ‘Strategic Users of
Culture. German Decisions for Military Action’, Contemporary Security Policy 33/1 (2012), 59–81.
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situation of having since 2001 presented the intervention in Afghanistan as
similar to the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, although the opera-
tional reality was an increase in violence. The adaptation of the political
discourse to the actual experience of German soldiers was slow, German
policy-makers being reluctant to use a vocabulary (‘war’, ‘killed in action’,
etc.) routinely employed in other countries.47
In that regard, the adoption of COIN by NATO and the US military was a
conceptual challenge for German policy-makers, as the word
Aufstandsbekämpfung (German for COIN) had become associated with the
combat operations in Ukraine during the Second World War. Although the
term was invented before the Second World War, it has become a potent
myth that it was a Nazi term,48 which created political diﬃculties. As a civil
servant from the German MoD explained:
All of our partners had, as western democracies, counterinsurgencies in their
history, the British in Kenya, the Dutch in Indonesia, the French in Algeria, and
so on and this it is easier for them to deal with counterinsurgencies today,
politically, socially, culturally. Not so for us; our experiences with insurgencies
are mostly based on the partisan combat of the Second World War with which
we by no means want to associate again.49
This uneasiness is obvious when looking at the doctrinal documents
produced by the Bundeswehr. Since 2005, the German army had codiﬁed
a concept of operations against irregular forces, which was a compilation
of tactical good practices lacking the socio-economic analysis of an insur-
gency, as it exists in the FM 3-24. Inﬂuenced by the ‘COIN turn’ occurring
under US leadership, the German army drafted in 2009 a document
originally entitled ‘Initial conceptual thinking on counter-insurgency’,
which was eventually renamed ‘Initial thinking on the military contribu-
tion to the establishment of security and public order in crisis regions’
after a long and painful inter-ministerial debate, while still using the
acronym ‘COIN’ (in English) in the text itself. The document does not
discuss the issue of civil-military relations in COIN, and is not even
compulsory. However, it is the ﬁrst import of the ‘clear-hold-build’ voca-
bulary derived from the FM 3-24.
As of 2011, Germany still did not have any COIN doctrine comparable
to those of France, the United Kingdom or the United States, leading
the German ministry of defence to issue a call for proposals, and
awarding a contract to Kiel University. Under the leadership of
Professor Joachim Krause, four workshops were organised with John
47Carolin Hilpert, Strategic Cultural Change and the Challenge for Security Policy. Germany and the
Bundeswehr’s Deployment to Afghanistan (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2014).
48The author is grateful to a reviewer for this remark.
49Hilpert, Strategic Cultural Change, 142.
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Nagl, fellow of the Center for a New American Security and co-author of
the FM 3-24, as a special advisor. The ﬁnal report, published in 2013, is
an analysis of the lessons learned in Afghanistan and of the NATO
doctrine of COIN, as well as a series of proposed institutional reforms
designed to increase the Bundeswehr’s operational eﬀectiveness. The
report is, unsurprisingly, heavily inﬂuenced by the NATO doctrine and
FM 3-24: it puts the civilian population at the heart of the main eﬀort
and calls for cooperation and the design of mutually reinforcing activ-
ities between civilian help and the military operations. The report is
then the ﬁrst to go beyond purely tactical concerns, and adopts the
same conclusions as the American, British, French and NATO doctrines.
The implementation of the recommendations is nevertheless diﬃcult, in
particular because of the resistance of the German development agency
GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) that fears
being instrumentalised and views its role as a neutral technical help,
rather than as the civilian component of a civil-military campaign. To
this day, the report’s conclusions have not been implemented in a new
German doctrine.
There is, then, in Germany a temptation to adopt a COIN doctrine, which
is frustrated by a cultural reluctance to use the term and a bureaucratic
resistance of the development agency. It is nevertheless interesting to
observe that the doctrinal thinking on this topic is directly imported from
the US and NATO experience, in particular through the participation of key
individuals serving as bridge-builders such as John Nagl.
For both France and Germany, NATO is then a major source of
inspiration in the development of a new COIN doctrine, but we can
observe a selective importation due to the weight of national experi-
ences of COIN.
Changes in Equipment
Following the Uzbeen ambush, Afghanistan became the operational priority
for French forces, a theatre of operations in which new materials were
introduced. The French APC, (called VAB for Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé) was
equipped with a tele-operated turret in 2009 in order to protect the gunner,
who could stay inside the vehicle. This upgrade of a ﬁghting vehicle ﬁrst
introduced in 1976 is the direct consequence of the observation of the
British and American experiences in Iraq. The arrival of the new helicopters,
Tigre, in 2009 – the result of a joint Franco-German programme launched in
1984 – also gave more ﬂexibility to the commanders on the ground, thanks
to the ﬁrepower and endurance of the system.50 The decision to engage the
50Brice Erbland, Dans les Griﬀes du Tigre. Libye-Afghanistan 2011 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres 2013).
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helicopters was taken after analysing the role of Close Air Support in
protecting the British outpost of Musah Qaleh in 2006, which was almost
overrun by insurgents in 2006.
France also conducted a number of oﬀ-the-shelf acquisitions, equipping
its forces with proven technologies available on the international market.
One-hundred and sixteen types of equipment were purchased between
2008 and 2011, for a total of €31 million. Some of these funds were used
to purchase equipment devoted to personal protection, such as new ﬂak
jackets and night-vision goggles similar to those used by American forces.
However, the most noticeable evolution was the acquisition of anti-IEDs
vehicles from the United States. France purchased ﬁve Buﬀalo-type MRAP
(mine-resistant ambush protected) vehicles from the US Marines in 2008, as
the historical truck manufacturer of the French army (Renault Truck Défense)
was unable to furnish MRAP vehicles in time for operations requiring force
protection. The system was purchased because French analysts considered it
eﬀective after evaluating its use by the American forces.51 Of course, France
developed its own systems. But it is striking to observe that the main anti-
IED system adopted by the French forces comes from the United States, and
that the employment of major national weapon systems such as the Tigre
helicopter or the VAB is predicated on the observation of the British experi-
ence. These two examples illustrate how the French forces combine the
existence of major national programmes of defence procurement with the
observation and importation of solutions from other NATO members.
The adoption of new materiel by the German forces was more compli-
cated, as it was constrained by a political speech emphasising ‘stabilisation’
and downplaying any combat activity. Until 2011, German leaders refused to
acknowledge the degradation of the situation on the ground. Because they
were trapped in the stabilisation narrative, the answers to the growing
diﬃculties on the ground were found in the augmentation of force protec-
tion, instead of battling the insurgents.52 This initial reaction of avoiding
contact with the local population delayed the process of adopting counter-
IED systems. Only in 2009 did the Bundeswehr acknowledge the capability
gap created by the absence of counter-IED systems comparable with those
already adopted by other NATO countries. A comparative study was con-
ducted and, although the American system was identiﬁed as the most
eﬃcient, it was not introduced. The oﬃcial reason was the diﬃculty in ﬁtting
the system to German vehicles. However, according to a German oﬃcial,
‘acquiring an American anti-IED system was inconvenient for German poli-
ticians, who were at the same time criticising the allegedly counter-
51Camille Sicourmat, ‘L’Adaptation des Forces Terrestres au Théâtre Afghan, 2008-2011’, in Camille
Sicourmat and Michel Goya (eds), L’Académie de la Boue. Regards Croisés sur l’Apprentissage des Forces
Armées (Paris: Irsem 2011), 54.
52Rid and Zapfe, ‘Mission Command Without a Mission’.
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productive American eﬀorts in the Southern and Eastern parts of
Afghanistan. They could not publicly admit that we had to do like the
United States, because we were facing a similar situation’.53 When the
oﬃcial narrative of stabilisation collapsed in 2011 because of the clear
degradation of the situation on the ground, the lack of relevant equipment
was criticised. The MP Helmut Könighaus even mentioned a ‘drama’ of
defence equipment. This change in political discourse forced the Bundeswehr
to quickly identify and adopt a counter-IED technology in order to replace the
previously declined American solution. The Swiss Mini Minewolf technology
was then adopted and distributed at the end of 2011. We observe here again a
selective emulation, with the research and identiﬁcation of a tested and
approved technology within NATO, whose adoption is delayed because of
the speciﬁcities of the German political context.
The second evolution is related to the German decision to acquire armed
drones, or UCAVs (unmanned combat air vehicles). Following the 1999
intervention in Kosovo, the Bundeswehr had already decided to acquire a
number of observation drones. However, the Germans realised the tactical
utility of armed drones through observing the use of armed drones by the
British and Americans. As the German state secretary for defence Rüdiger
Wolf explains: ‘The experiences of our partners have demonstrated the value
of armed drones in combatting [asymmetric] threats – especially because of
their high availability and the low risks that own forces are occurring by
using them. Hence, our Afghanistan experience had a practical impact on
our general assessment of UCAVs’.54 Here again, the acquisition decision is
heavily inﬂuenced by the German political context.
The use of armed drones by the Bush and Obama administration largely
shaped a popular opinion of drones as terror instruments, conducting illegal
missions and creating heavy civilian casualties. As such, a public debate
emerged in Germany regarding the opportunity to acquire armed drones,
with the German Minister of Defence, De Maizière, declaring in 2012 that
drones were essentially planes ﬂown from a distance, and since planes were
armed, there were no reasons why drones could not be armed too. The chief
of staﬀ of the German air force, General Müllner, also explained that recon-
naissance drones were already in use in Afghanistan in order to discover
enemy positions, and that it would make no sense to attack such positions
with planes for ‘political reasons’ while they could be directly attacked with
the drones themselves. Inﬂuential German decision-makers are set on the
idea of acquiring armed drones because of their tactical and operational
eﬃciency at the hands of British and American operators. Yet, the German
public opinion needs more convincing and, if the acquisition of MALE
53Interview in Berlin.
54Hilpert, Strategic Cultural Change, 152.
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(Medium Altitude Long Endurance) drones is already decided, it remains to
be seen whether they will be armed or not, a consequence of the political
debate that emerged in 2012–13.
Comparing the French and German experiences, we observe that France
must reconcile the existence of major national programmes with operational
constraints and import tactical solutions from the British or the Americans,
or even buy new materials oﬀ the shelf when a national solution is not
available. German policy-makers are less constrained by the national
defence industry than by a political context in which the German population
is reluctant towards the use of force or the Afghanistan mission: there is
then a dynamic of emulation ﬁltered by the political context.
Conclusion
This article’s goal was twofold. First, it introduced the concept of ‘selective
emulation’ to explain the patterns of military change within states ﬁghting
in the framework of a multinational intervention. Second, it aimed to look at
whether there was something ‘exceptional’ about French military adapta-
tion, in particular in the light of some French experts’ claims that France is
good at looking at its own historical experience but not at other countries.
In both cases, we can observe a similar process of selective emulation. In
both France and Germany, the importation of doctrinal solutions was ﬁl-
tered by national historical experiences with COIN. Regarding the materials,
the process of French emulation was ﬁltered by the importance of the
national industrial base, while the German process was ﬁltered by a strategic
culture reluctant to the use of force (Table 2).
As such, there is a form of exceptionality of French military adaptation,
based on a combination of historical experiences and the existence of a
strong defence industry. But these two elements are intervening variables
within a larger framework of selective emulation. The French armed forces
are as quick as others to borrow from other countries what seems to be an
eﬃcient solution to a tactical/doctrinal problem, especially in the context of
a multinational military intervention whose institutional framework facili-
tates such exchanges.
The result should not be surprising: as military organisations should be
aiming at eﬃciency in order to achieve victory on the battleﬁeld, sometimes
Table 2. Filters to emulation.
France Germany
Doctrine National historical experience of COIN (Algeria) National historical experience of
COIN (Ukraine)
Materials Major procurements programmes and national
industry constraining available options.
Strategic culture reluctant
towards the use of force.
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eﬃciency means importing already-tested solutions. This observation might
be less romantic than the myth that some in the French defence community
(and outside) like to tell of the French armed forces having something
special when it comes to military adaptation for war amongst the people,
something of a ‘French touch’ or ‘French ﬂair’. But this might instead be the
upside of belonging to an alliance: the experience of one beneﬁts the
others. In that regard, the French armed forces are no exception.
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